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1 Introduction
Chronic budgetary problems have led many governments to franchise roads to private rms. In a
typical deal a private franchise holder is granted the right to charge tolls for a xed period of time.
In exchange for the toll revenue, the franchise holder nances, builds, operates and maintains the
road.2
When the franchised road has no close substitute, the government must regulate tolls. Yet
when there are many ways of getting from one point to another, as often is the case in large
cities, regulation may be avoided by allowing competition between several franchise owners. The
purpose of this paper is to study the competitive game between road operators and to evaluate the
welfare implications of toll competition. A pair of locations joined by several asymmetric roads
is considered. Each road is subject to congestion and run by a dierent operator. Private road
owners compete by setting tolls.
The paper has two main results. First, we nd sucient conditions for existence of a pure
strategy equilibrium with strictly positive tolls. The franchise holder incurs no direct costs when
one additional car uses the road. Nevertheless, while a lower toll reduces the out-of-pocket cost paid
by a user, it increases the congestion cost thereby reducing the driver's willingness to pay for using
the road. Franchise holders partly internalize congestion costs when setting tolls, which softens
price competition. Even though franchise holders compete by choosing prices, the equilibrium is
similar to the one that obtains in a standard Cournot game. The cost of congestion acts like the
capacity constraint in Kreps and Scheinkman's (1983) two stage oligopoly game in which capacity
is chosen in the rst stage and rms compete in prices in the second stage. This runs counter to the
intuition that price competition will lead to Bertrand outcomes and excessive congestion (see, for
example, de Palma [1992]). Moreover, the trac assignment between roads is generally inecient.
The second result shows that increased competition brings tolls closer to the socially optimal
level, even when roads are asymmetric, facility owners price strategically, and both the number of
roads and demand increase at the same rate|that is, in the limit equilibrium tolls are just enough
to make each driver internalize the congestion externality even when the ratio between the size of
demand and the number of roads is kept constant.
2See Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (1997) for a discussion of highway franchising.
1This paper is related to the literature on road pricing pioneered by Walters (1961).3 Tradi-
tionally, this literature has studied road pricing as a standard planning problem.4 Exceptions are
Viton (1995), who studies whether a private road can protably compete with an untolled public
road; and Verhoef, Nijkamp and Rietveld (1996), who consider the tolls set by a prot-maximizing
private road owner competing with an untolled road. Our model generalizes the one developed in
Verhoef et al. (1996) to study strategic toll setting by competing private road owners.
The paper also suggests that there is a close relation between the economics of franchised roads
and the economics of clubs.5 Roads are subject to congestion, much like standard club goods. As
in Scotchmer's (1985a, 1985b) analysis of club goods, this paper models the strategic interaction
of road owners and looks for Nash equilibria. In the case of roads the analysis is simplied by
Wardrop's (1952) characterization of equilibrium trac assignments among roads. Unlike Scotch-
mer (1985a, 1985b), this paper considers asymmetric roads, since geographic constraints determine
the characteristics of competing roads. For similar reasons this paper does not assume free entry,
a point emphasized by Scotchmer.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section 3 we solve
the problem of the social planner. Section 4 analyzes competition among roads. Section 5 studies
the case where competition increases and nally, section 6 concludes.
2 The model
There are n roads that join two locations. The marginal benet of an additional trip when Q trips





3See Hau (1992) for a survey and Mohring (1994) for a collection of the most important articles.
4For early contributions see L evy-Lambert (1968) and Marchand (1968). Recent contributions are the series of
papers by Arnott et al. (1990, 1993, 1994).
5See, for example, Berglas (1976, 1981), Berglas and Pines (1981), Boadway (1980) and Scotchmer (1985a, 1985b).
2where qi is the number of trips made on road i. We assume that trac imposes no maintenance
or other costs on the road operator.6 The cost of making one trip on road i has two components.
First, the toll charged by the road operator, pi; second, the time cost of making a trip when qi cars
are already on the road, ci(qi), where ci > 0, c0
i > 0, and c00
i > 0. Thus pi +ci(qi) is the generalized
travel cost faced by each driver. As is well known since Wardrop (1952), in equilibrium the number
of cars on road i is determined by
B(Q)=pi + ci(qi); (2)
for all roads i; that is, users will enter roads until the marginal benet of an additional trip equals
the generalized travel cost in each of the n roads. We are ready to examine the social planner's
problem.
3 The social planner
In this section we solve the problem of a social planner that can choose both the total number of
vehicles traveling, Q, and their distribution on alternative roads, (qi)n











The rst term is the sum of benets that drivers obtain from Q 
P
i qi trips. The second term
is the sum of the congestion costs borne by drivers. Since tolls redistribute income from users to
the owner of the road, they do not aect social surplus directly. Next we show that the objective
function (3) is concave and provide conditions for existence and uniqueness of a solution.
Proposition 3.1 The function S(q1;:::;q n) is strictly concave. Furthermore, if for all i
lim
qi!1ci(qi)+qic0
i(qi) − B(qi) > 0; (4)
6It is straightforward to extend the present framework to include other costs internalized by each road operator
such as road deterioration.
3then there exists a unique solution to (3), q  (q
1;:::;q
n).7
Proof: See the appendix.
Assume all trac ﬂows in the planner's solution are positive. It then follows from Proposition 3.1






qj) − ci − qic0
i =0 ; (5)









i. That is, the benet derived from the last trip must be equal to the sum
of the private cost ci and the congestion externality qic0
i(qi)i na l lo ft h en roads. From the
equilibrium condition (2) and the optimality condition (6) it follows that the planner can implement









Consider now the case when each road is owned by a dierent operator and they compete for trac
by simultaneously choosing tolls. The owner of road itakes (pj)j6=i as given and solves:
max
pi
i  piqi: (7)
In this section we prove existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and show that in equilib-
rium the number of vehicles on the road is less than optimal. Moreover, we show with an example
that the trac assignment is inecient when congestion costs are asymmetric, i.e., the marginal
cost of using a road (including congestion costs) is not equalized across roads.
7Condition (4) holds, in particular, when limq!1 B(q)=0 .
4We begin by proving a series of lemmas before getting to the main proposition of the section.
Given p 2 R I n we may interpret (2) as dening q 2 R I n as a function of p. We show next that the
corresponding inverse function|q as a function of p|is well dened:
Lemma 4.1 Equation (2) implicitly denes q as a function of p. Furthermore, this function is
continuously dierentiable in all coordinates.
Proof: See the appendix.
The following lemma conrms the signs one expects for the own and cross partial derivatives of
trac with respect to tolls. It also derives identities relating both kinds of derivatives.
Lemma 4.2 The functions qi(p), dened implicitly via (2), are such that (i) @qi=@pi < 0 and (ii)




















Proof: See the appendix.
Note that equation (8) implies that c0
j(qj)(@qj=@pi) does not depend on j; 8j 6= i.
Lemma 4.3 For all i, ci(q)+qc0
i(q) is increasing in q.
Proof: Trivial, given the properties of the cost function.
The following result provides sucient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1 Dene ki =1 =c0
i(qi) and denote S−i(k)=
P















j; for all i: (10)
Then there exists an interior Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: See the appendix for the proof and for non trivial examples where the above conditions
hold.
We are now ready to prove the main result in this section.
5Proposition 4.2 Let (pN
i ;qN
i ;Q N)n
i=1 be the Nash equilibrium (assumed interior). Then: (i) QN <
Q. (ii) The trac assignment across roads may be inecient.
Proof: (i) From the equilibrium condition (2) we have that
B(QN) − ci(qN














=0 ; 8i: (12)
Using the rst order condition (12) to substitute for qi, in equation (11) leads to
B(QN) − ci(qN












where the last inequality is due to (8). Now, suppose that, contrary to the proposition, QN  Q.












where the strict inequality follows from (13) and the weak inequality from Lemma 4.3. But since
B0(Q) < 0, QN <Q , in contradiction with our initial assumption, which completes the rst part
of the proof.
(ii) To prove the second part of the proposition we present a counterexample that shows that the
Nash equilibrium does not always lead to an ecient assignment of trac. Let ci(qi)=ciqi;i=1 ;2
and B(Q)=1− Q. The corresponding demand functions for the roads are:
qi =
c3−i − (1 + c3−i)pi + p3−i
(1 + c1)(1 + c2) − 1
;i =1 ;2:
Solving the rst order conditions for each rm leads to the Nash equilibrium tolls:
pi =
2c3−i(1 + ci)+ci
4(1 + c1)(1 + c2) − 1
;i =1 ;2:
6Replacing in the expression for qi we can compute the total marginal cost TMCi = ci(qi)+qic0
i(qi).
Performing the computations leads to TMCi = TMCj if and only if ci = cj. Hence the trac
assignment in the example is inecient unless congestion costs are identical across roads.
5 Limit results
In the previous section we have shown that the Nash equilibrium of the game between road owners
is inecient. In this section we show that as the economy becomes large, tolls converge to the
socially optimal level. In order to get interesting results, we allow demand for roads to grow at
the same rate as capacity expands. Nevertheless, drivers are free to choose any of the roads on
any of the networks. Hence, our limit results depends solely on the reduction in the relative size of
each individual owner with respect to the market and hence on her smaller ability to aect prices.
We begin by considering the replication of complete road networks, where networks are composed
of n  1 roads with possibly dierent congestion costs. The rst result is that the trac in each
network tends to the ecient assignment as the number of replications increases.8 Next we consider
the special case where networks have only one road and extend the previous result by showing that
convergence is monotonous in the number of roads.
Consider the case where there are R identical networks, each one composed of n (possibly
asymmetric) roads. The following notation is used throughout:
 qr
i(R): trac on road i in network r,
 pr




i(R): total trac on network r,
 QR 
PR
r=1 Qr(R): trac over the R networks.
Demand is assumed to grow at the same rate as capacity. That is, each time that a network is
replicated another set of drivers with demand B(Q) is added. Hence the marginal benet function
for the replicated network, denoted by BR(Q), is related to the marginal benet function of an






Denition: A symmetric equilibrium satises qi(R)  qr
i(R), pi(R)  pr
i(R)a n dQr(R)  Q(R)
for all i, r.
The following proposition shows that when the number of replications is very large, each road
in each network approximately carries the optimal number of users and charges the optimal toll.
Proposition 5.1 Assume the planner's solution, which trivially is independent of the number of
replications, is interior. Then for suciently large R there exists a unique interior symmetric











Proof: Whenever it is not a source of confusion, we omit writing out explicit dependence on R.
From (2) we have BR(QR)=pr
j + cj(qr
j), and since BR(QR)=B(QR=R)=B(Q), it follows
that B(Q)=pr
j + cj(qr
j), which, by symmetry, can be written as
B(Q)=pj + cj(qj);j =1 ;:::;n (16)

















 dij;s 6= r or s = r and j 6= i; i;j =1 ;:::;n:
Thus dii denotes the cross partial derivative of trac with respect to tolls for the same road on
dierent networks, while di denotes the own price elasticity for any of the R versions of road i.







;j ; i =1 ;:::;n: (17)








dji +( R − 1)dii
3
5 =1+c0
i(qi)di;i =1 ;:::;n (18)
where we used the fact that B0
R(QR)=B0(QR=R)=R = B0(Q)=R. Now, substituting into (18) the









































Since B0 < 0a n dc0















where di and c0
i depend on R and limR!1 Oi(1=R)=0 ;i=1 ;:::;n.
Now the rst order conditions can be written (using symmetry) as:
qi + pidi =0 : (22)
Replacing (16) and (21) in the rst order conditions and manipulating yields
ci(qi)+qic0
i(qi) − B(Q)=[ B(Q − ci(qi)])Oi();i =1 ;:::;n; (23)
9where   1=R. Next we extend the Oi() functions to all  2 [0;1] in such a way that the
resulting functions are continuously dierentiable and then apply the Implicit Function Theorem
to the set of equations in (23) at qi = q
i and  = 0 (i.e., at the planner's solution). The proof that
the corresponding Jacobian is non singular is analogous to that of Lemma 4.1. It follows that (23)
has a unique solution for all  in a neighborhood of  = 0 (i.e., for all R large enough) and, since
the solution is continuous in , that the corresponding qi's converge to q
i as  tends to zero.




















The previous result shows that the allocation of trac in a road system where independent road
owners set tolls converges to the ecient allocation as the capacity of each road becomes smaller
in relation to size of the market. In the special case in which each \network" has a single road we
can go further and show that convergence to the ecient allocation is monotonic.
Denition 5.1 Let p1(q)=B(q)−c1(q). We denote the elasticity of demand in an economy with
one road by 1(q)=p1(q)=[qp0
1(q)].
Proposition 5.2 Suppose each network consists of a single road, and that 1
0(q)  0 and 1(q) 
−1.9 Then, under the same assumptions of the previous proposition, in the symmetric equilibrium,
as the number of roads R increases, prices and quantities tend monotonically to their ecient
values.





9Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (1998) show that B
00  0 is sucient for both conditions on 1 to hold.











We now replace (16) and (24) in the rst order conditions (22) to obtain:






























[B(q) − c(q)]: (25)







0(q)+[ R + 1(q)][c0(q)+qc00(q)] + (R − 1)[B0(q) − c0(q)]: (27)
From the assumptions on 1(q) and (27) it follows that L(q) > 0. Also, the left hand side of (26)
is negative by (13). Therefore (26) implies that
dq
dR > 0. And since (16) implies that
dp
dR






dR < 0, which completes the proof.
116 Conclusion
There are two important conclusions from this paper. At rst sight it would appear that, as in the
case of Bertrand competition, toll competition between two roads that are substitutes will lead to
tolls set at marginal cost, i.e., zero in our case. However, lowering tolls raises congestion costs for
all users of the road and therefore does not lead to a complete switch of users to the road with the
lowest toll. Hence, the owner of each road faces a demand curve that is not innitely elastic. Thus
our rst result that competition yields tolls that are higher than optimal and trac ﬂows that are
ineciently small. The result is due to the capacity constraint in roads, i.e., it is related to the idea
that a price game when there are capacity constraints does not lead to the Bertrand result but is
closer to a Cournot equilibrium (see Kreps and Scheinkman [1983]).
It is interesting to note that a similar result holds for a toll road that is a substitute of a public
untolled road. The owner of the tolled road will be able to exact a positive toll, given sucient
congestion on the alternative road. A decrease in congestion in the untolled road hurts the private
road. Hence, its owner will oppose all attempts to increase the capacity of the untolled road. For
example, in the case of the Dulles Greenway near Washington D.C., a toll road that joins Dulles
Airport to Leesburg in Virginia, the owner of the road has opposed the expansion of competitive
public freeways which are untolled.10
The second result shows that as the number of independently owned roads increases the in-
creased number of participants in the market makes road system more competitive, even if demand
increases at the same rate. In fact, in the limit both total trac ﬂow and trac allocation will be
ecient. This suggests that in some cases where there is more than one road joining two cities or
parts of a city, toll competition may be a viable way of regulating private roads.
Finally, it is noteworthy to remark on the close relationship between the economic analysis
of competition between private toll roads and competition between clubs, which may allow the
transfer of results between these two areas.
10See Viton (1995) and Verhoef et al. (1996) for analyses of a private road competing with an untolled alternative.
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Proof of Proposition 4.1































Some patient, but straightforward calculations then show that:
@qi
@pi
= −ki(1 − Ai);i =1 ;:::;n; (28)
@ql
@pi
= klAi;l 6= i;i =1 ;:::;n; (29)
@kj
@pi
= −γjAi;j 6= i;i =1 ;:::;n; (30)
@ki
@pi





= γi − S(γ)Ai; (32)
ki − S(k)Ai =
−ki ~ B
Pn






= −[ki − S(k)Ai] < 0; (34)
@ ~ B
@pi






fγi(1 − Ai) − Ai[γi − S(γ)Ai] − Ai[ki − S(k)Ai]g: (36)
15Next we prove strict concavity of the prot function of the i-th road's owner. This implies the
existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (see Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green, 1995, p.
260).












Since @qi=@pi < 0, a sucient condition for strict concavity of the prot function (and therefore
existence of a Nash equilibrium) is that @2qi=@p2
i  0.




= −γi(1 − Ai)3 +[ S(γ) − γi]A3
i − [ki − S(k)Ai]A2
i: (37)
From (33) it follows that ki − S(k)Ai > 0.
Some patient algebra shows that
γi(1 − Ai)3 − [S(γ) − γi]A3
i  0











j6=i kj, S−i(γ) analogous.
And since γi = k3
i c00
i,w h e r ec00
i is evaluated at qi, condition (38) is equivalent to (10). It now
follows from (37) that a sucient condition for strict concavity of the prot function is that B00  0
(so that   0) and (37), thereby concluding the proof.
Next some particular cases where the assumptions of Proposition 4.1 hold are presented. In the
linear case @2qi=@p2
i =0 ,s ot h a t i is strictly concave without a further do. The case of quadratic














0 > 0, 
(i)
1 > 0a n d
(i)










Then a sucient condition for (10) to hold is:




j; for all i. (39)
Two particular cases are of interest. First, when all 
(i)
2 's are identical. In this case  =1a n d
existence follows for any function B(Q) that is concave and decreasing. Second, if B(Q)=B0−B1Q,












is sucient for existence of a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Let 1n;n and D(1;:::; n) denote, respectively, a n by n matrix with all elements equal to 1
and a diagonal matrix with i-th element on the diagonal equal to i. A straightforward calculation
shows that the Hessian of S may be written as
H = k1n;n − D(1;:::; n) (40)
where k  B0(
P
qi)a n dj  2c0
j(qj)+qjc00
j(qj).









Since k<0a n da l lj > 0, it suces that one of the xi' sd i  e rf r o mz e r ot oh a v ex0Hx<0. Thus
S is strictly concave.
11The non-trivial assumption is 
(i)
1 > 0, we want c
0
i(0) > 0.






qj) − ci(qi) − qic0
i(qi)  B(qi) − ci(qi) − qic0
i(qi): (41)
It then follows from assumption (4) that there exist q1;:::;qn such that the partial derivative
evaluated at q =( q1;:::;q n) is negative if any of the qi's is larger than the corresponding qi. Hence
we may restrict maximization of S to a compact subset of the positive orthant. Since a continuous
function over a compact set has a maximum, it follows that S has a maximum. Due to strict
concavity of S this maximum, denoted by q, is unique.
Proof of Lemma 4.1
A straightforward calculation shows that the Jacobian matrix corresponding to p as a function
of q is of the form
J  k1n;n − D(1;:::; n);
where the notation is the same as in the proof of Proposition 3.1 and i = c0
i(xi) > 0, i =1 ;:::;n.
Denote the i-th column of the Jacobian matrix by Ji. To show that the Jacobian is non singular,
we show that if 1;:::; n are real numbers such that
P
i iJi =0 n,w h e r e0 n denotes the vector
in R I n with all coordinates equal to zero, then all the i's are equal to zero.
A straightforward calculation shows that
P












= j;j =1 ;:::;n:















Since all j are positive, it follows from (42) that all i have the same sign. If all i are strictly







w h i c hc a n n o th o l ds i n c ek<0a n dt h ej > 0. It follows that all i =0 .
Having shown that the Jacobian is non singular, we may now apply the Implicit Function
Theorem to conclude that the inverse function is well dened and dierentiable.
Proof of Lemma 4.2
From (2), pj +cj(qj)=pi+ci(qi);j6= i. Dierentiating with respect to pi leads to the identity
in (8). Dierentiating both sides of (2) with respect to pi leads to the identity in (9).










;j 6= i: (44)
Next we prove (i) and (ii). From the identity in (8) and the assumption that all c0
j > 0w e
have that all @qj=@pi have the same sign, j 6= i. If this common sign were negative, (8) implies
that @qi=@pi < 0 and the left hand side of (44) would be negative while the corresponding right
hand side was positive. If all @qj=@pi were equal to zero, j 6= i, then (44) and the assumption that
B0 < 0i m p l yt h a t@qi=@pi = 0. Yet then the right hand side of (8) would be positive while the
left hand side is zero. We conclude that @qj=@pi > 0 for all j 6= i. It then follows from (44) that
@qi=@pi < 0, for otherwise the left hand side of (44) would be positive while the right hand side
was negative. We have thus shown (i) and (ii). The inequalities in (8) and (9) now follow trivially.
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